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Abstract 
Using a comprehensive survey, we show that investors with a larger capital allocation to private 
equity are more specialized − measured by the degree to which the investor focuses on private equity 
rather than other classes of investments − and have a wider scope of due diligence and investment 
activities. Other investor characteristics (experience, type, location, compensation structure, number 
of funds under management) play no role. In particular, Endowments are not special according to 
the survey measures. These results are consistent with the changing LP-GP relationship in private 
equity as capital is increasingly concentrated in the hands of large investors. 
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This paper conducts a worldwide survey of Limited Partners (LPs) — the name given to institutional 
investors which allocate money to Private Equity funds. The goal is to investigate the dimensions 
along which LPs differ in (i) their due diligence practices regarding their potential investments in 
private equity funds, and (ii) the extent to which the investment professionals in charge of the private 
equity portfolio are specialized to that task. 
 Previous work has pointed toward endowment investors as especially successful, 
sophisticated and diligent private equity investors. For example, Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai 
(2007) argue that certain types of investors are better able to process information about opaque asset 
classes such as private equity. They find evidence that endowments outperform other type of 
investors on their private equity investment decisions. They further connect this finding to a broader 
literature, arguing that differences in performance may be caused by differing levels of sophistication 
in selecting investments, and by ‘cultural’ differences such as the use of performance-based 
compensation or high staff turnover rates. On the other hand, Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach (2014) 
find that the outperformance of endowments no longer holds in the most recent decade of data. This 
raises the question of whether endowments really are different from other types of investors and 
whether, as Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach (2014) argue, endowments were just lucky in the early 
part of the sample period because they had access to top venture capital funds at that time. Our paper 
is uniquely positioned to answer the question of whether endowments are special amongst LPs, 
because it has direct evidence on what LPs actually do when it comes to selecting and monitoring 
GPs. 
We contacted the (nearly) 2,000 LPs that are listed in the Limited Partners Directory 
published by Private Equity International, a consultancy firm. We invited these LPs to answer 
detailed questions about their due diligence process and offered to give them the aggregate results 
once our survey was finished. This gave these LPs the opportunity to benchmark their due diligence, 
free-of-charge and anonymously. We obtained 249 sufficiently complete responses spanning 30 
countries. Respondents range from Pension Funds and Endowments, to Family Offices. To our 
knowledge, this is the largest survey of private equity investors to-date in terms of the number of 
respondents, geographical coverage, and scope. 
The main results are easy to summarize: the only consistently significant dimension along 
which LPs differ in their practices is the size of the private equity portfolio (in absolute value). The 
institutions with large allocations to private equity are those spending most time on due diligence for 
each fund and those undertaking the most initiatives in the due diligence process. There are a number 
of other LP characteristics that are not related to the intensity of due diligence. Perhaps the most 
notable of these, given prior literature, is whether the LP is an endowment. More broadly, this paper 
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sheds new light on the way in which investors seek to address information asymmetries when they 
invest in opaque asset classes such as private equity. 
Firstly, we measure the specialization of investment teams. We ask whether the professionals 
in charge of private equity investing are also responsible for investing in real estate (a related asset 
class) or in hedge funds (an unrelated asset class, but one that often goes under the same umbrella of 
‘alternative investments’), and the fraction of investments that are made via fund-of-funds. We find 
that LP size is significantly related to each measure of team specialization. Private equity teams at 
larger LPs are more likely to supervise only private equity funds and invest less via funds-of-funds. 
Smaller LPs are less specialized, but they outsource their due diligence to a similar extent as larger 
LPs. Hence those smaller LPs that manage private equity alongside hedge funds and real estate are 
not just outsourcing due diligence activities. They undertake less due diligence, whether in-house or 
outsourced. 
We then ask investors about due diligence and monitoring activities. We find that investors’ 
scope of activities, including those outsourced, is strongly related to their size. Larger LPs engage in 
a wider range of due diligence activities, including legal activities (e.g., benchmark and negotiate 
contracts), accounting activities (e.g., develop their own models to evaluate funds’ reported Net 
Asset Values), co-investing in deals alongside the private equity funds to which they have committed 
capital, visiting and interviewing portfolio company executives, and sitting on private equity funds’ 
advisory boards. This result holds when controlling for the fraction invested via fund-of-funds to 
account for the possibility that smaller LPs may outsource indirectly by investing more in fund-of-
funds. Consistently, we also find that large LPs spend more than twice as much time evaluating a 
given investment proposal than small LPs.  
Our results are robust to the inclusion of control variables that account for alternative 
explanations. In particular, we control for the fraction of the LP parent’s portfolio allocated to private 
equity and for the existence of performance-based salary. Hence, our results are not driven by 
organizations exerting higher effort when private equity is a more important part of their portfolio 
or when employees are better incentivized. Furthermore, we find that larger LPs have more 
investment professionals but that their number is not strongly related to the scope of activities. 
The conditional correlations we document are interesting per se and show a robust pattern in 
the data. Interpreting these results as causal, however, is challenging. In particular, reverse causality 
is plausible: some investors start operating in a more thorough way than others and are therefore 
more successful. Because they are more successful, they end up with more money to manage. Hence 
it is the wider scope of activities that implies larger LP size and not vice versa. To assess this 
perspective, we conduct three tests. First, we show that LP size remains strongly correlated to the 
scope of investor activities for LPs whose allocation depends less on past performance (which we 
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ask directly in our survey). Second, we show that the same holds for LPs who have less than ten 
years of track record. This is particularly salient, as size depends much less on past performance for 
these LPs. Third, our results hold when we control for the share allocated to private equity by the 
LP’s parent, which under the reverse causality hypothesis, should be the one driving force behind 
investors’ scope of activity. Although we cannot rule out reverse causality, none of these tests 
support this view. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 provides 
empirical evidence on investors’ organizational structure; Section 4 provides evidence on investors’ 
scope of due diligence and monitoring activities. Section 5 focuses on the relation between team size 
and LP size. Section 6 examines investor investment criteria. Section 7 concludes by discussing the 
implications of our results. 
2. Data and investor characteristics 
2.1. Survey design 
The survey was designed with the help of a senior LP executive and was presented to investors as a 
unique opportunity to (anonymously) benchmark their due diligence practices against those of a 
large set of other investors for free. Respondents do not therefore have clear incentives to 
misrepresent any information. 
To construct our sample of respondents, we used the 2008 Directory of Limited Partners 
published by Private Equity International (PEI). During the year 2009, we emailed all of the 1,723 
LPs listed in the directory to introduce the survey and to provide the website address for responding.1 
Respondents to the survey could leave their contact details; two thirds did so. When investors left 
their contact details but did not answer some of the questions, we followed up by phone. 
We have received 249 responses from LPs in 30 countries, giving a response rate of 14.4%. 
This compares well to other academic large-scale surveys. For example, the CFO survey of Graham 
and Harvey (2001) had a response rate of 8.9%. We believe that this relatively high response rate 
reflects a significant interest in the investor community about how others perform due diligence.2 
2.2. Main investor characteristics and sample representativeness 
From the survey, we obtain LP characteristics that could explain heterogeneity in due diligence 
practices. Four of these characteristics are also available in PEI and can help us gauge the 
representativeness of our sample. In this sub-section, we describe these four investor characteristics. 
                                                            
1 The Directory contains several organizations that are GPs, or that no longer invest in private equity. It also contains 
fund-of-funds, which we exclude. 
2 Groh and Liechtenstein (2011) conduct a similar survey on how investors select venture capital funds. 
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 2.2.1 LP Type 
The first characteristic we collect is ‘LP type’, i.e., the nature of the parent organization. This is 
motivated by the study of Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007), who point out that an important 
source of heterogeneity across institutional investors is their organizational type. They find that 
endowments outperform other types, and infer a number of advantages that endowments have over 
other investor types when it comes to investing in alternative asset classes in general, and in private 
equity in particular.  
We classify LPs into six organizational types: i) Public pension funds, ii) Corporate pension 
funds, iii) Endowments (which include foundations), iv) Insurance companies, v) Banks and Finance 
companies, v) Other (mostly sovereign wealth funds and family desks). 
The largest category in the sample is public pension funds, comprising almost one third of 
the respondents. The sample splits fairly equally across the other five types, as shown in Table 1 – 
Panel A. The smallest type, corporate pension funds, represents 8% of the sample. Compared to the 
PEI universe we have a similar percentage for endowments, insurance companies and banks, more 
public pension funds and other types (mostly government-owned LPs), and fewer corporate pension 
funds. Overall, all categories are well represented. 
 2.2.2 LP Location  
The second LP characteristic we look at is the country of location of the private equity investment 
committee (or the person taking the private equity investment decisions). Location may matter in 
several ways. Investors in North America (USA and Canada) may be seen as more prestigious, and 
are likely to have access to a better labor market for asset managers; they are also geographically 
closer to the majority of private equity funds. Second, the rules that investors and private equity 
funds need to follow vary across countries. Location is therefore a potential source of heterogeneity 
across investors.   
We pool countries to form regions. As shown in Table 1 – Panel B, North American investors 
are the largest group with 33% of the respondents. Yet, we have relatively fewer North American 
investors and more European investors than the PEI Directory population. Our high response rate in 
Scandinavia is mainly due to the higher willingness of investors in those countries to answer the 
survey. In North America we had difficulties reaching out to investors; yet, those investors represent 
the main group in our sample. 
2.2.3 LP Size 
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In complex and illiquid asset classes such as private equity, there are substantial fixed costs 
that may affect the way investments are made. We therefore ask LPs the amount they invest in buyout 
and the amount they invest in venture capital. The sum of the two is the amount the LP invests in 
private equity (LP size). We split the sample into five almost equal groups. Table 1 – Panel C shows 
the wide dispersion in capital allocated to private equity across investors. Almost one investor in 
three has less than $100 million invested in private equity, while another one in six investors has 
more than $2 billion invested in the same.  
We have relatively few very small investors (those with less than $100 million in private 
equity). This group is less well staffed and spends a lot less of their resources in the investment 
process. Hence filing our survey is more costly for them, and they may see little benefit in 
participating. In the other size categories, we closely match the proportions of the PEI directory. 
2.2.4 LP Experience 
In asset classes characterized by a large asymmetry of information, such as private equity, 
investor’s experience may be a distinctive factor. It is often argued that early movers in the private 
equity industry are at an advantage, with the endowments of Yale University and Harvard University 
often cited as examples (see Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015), Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach 
(2014), and Swensen (2000)). In addition, more experienced investors may behave differently as 
they may have learnt over time how to perform more effective due diligence. They may also expend 
less effort because they are more productive. Our sample and the PEI universe are fairly close on 
that dimension (Table 1 – Panel D), with an over-representation of younger investors and under-
representation of very long-established investors (over 15 years of experience). 
< Table 1 > 
 
3. Organizational Structure and Human Resources 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for investor characteristics related to organizational structure and 
human resources. Panel A shows statistics for continuous variables, and panel B shows statistics for 
binary variables. 
 The mean LP size is $1.3 billion, with wide variation across LPs. The LP’s parent 
organization, say the insurance company or pension fund that owns it, may play a role in due 
diligence activities. More experienced parents may have accumulated substantial due diligence 
experience; may be perceived as a prestigious employer or client; and may have established a strong 
network of connections that facilitate information gathering. We construct parent experience as the 
number of years it has been in operation in 2008. On average, the parent organization is 44 years old 
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(Table 2 – Panel A). A parent with a large amount of assets under management may give the LP 
stronger bargaining power. We observe wide variation in this variable, with the 25th percentile at 
$0.7 billion and the 75th percentile at $15 billion.  
In terms of staffing, we find that the average private equity investment team is composed of 
6.4 (full time equivalent) investment professionals, with a skewed distribution. The 25th percentile 
investor has only one investment professional, and even the 75th percentile investor has five. The 
number of investment committee members is more narrowly and evenly distributed, with an average 
of 7.1 members. Interestingly, the inter-quartile range for the investment committee members (four 
to eight members) is similar to what has been identified in the literature as the optimal size for 
corporate boards (see Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)). 
< Table 2 > 
Next, we turn to some variables that measure how money is deployed into private equity. We 
first compute the allocation to private equity as the ratio of LP size to parent-size (amount under 
management). This variable provides a clear measure of how important private equity is for the 
parent’s investments. A quarter of the investors have less than 3% of their funds allocated to private 
equity while another quarter of the investors have more than 26%.  
The number of funds an LP invests into reveals how organizations allocate money. The inter-
quartile range is 9 to 56, which seems quite large given the small number of investment professionals. 
Taking the ratio, we find that on average one professional is responsible for 17.8 funds, with 
substantial variation across LPs. The workload is high also in terms of funds per professional, with 
an average just over $200 million per professional and an inter-quartile range of $40 million to $288 
million per professional. 
We then consider the characteristics of the individuals who manage the LP, as industry 
experience or personal networks may have a first-order effect on how investments are made (Kaplan, 
Sensoy, and Strömberg (2009)). The industry experience of the members of the private equity 
investment committee averages ten years, and the dispersion across LPs is moderate. 
Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) conjecture that LPs like pension funds may be more 
prone to staff turnover, with a negative effect on due diligence. We therefore ask LPs how many 
people have left the investment committee over the previous five years, and define this turnover as 
the ratio of this number to the number of investment committee members. The average turnover rate 
is one fourth, and variation is substantial: more than a quarter of the LPs had no turnover at all, while 
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a quarter experienced a turnover above 40%.3 The last variable in Panel A is the percentage of fund-
of-funds in the private equity portfolio. This is a measure of the extent to which LPs delegate the 
investment decision to specialized intermediaries. Many investors have none but the average investor 
has 18% of its money in fund-of-funds. 
Table 2 – Panel B reports the frequency of several binary variables. We first measure whether 
the private equity team is also responsible for hedge funds or real estate funds. Hedge funds, real 
estate and private equity are often all classified as ‘alternative investments’. Although there can be 
some overlap between real estate and private equity in terms of investment skills, because the 
investment structure is similar (private partnerships), there is hardly any investment skills overlap 
between hedge funds and private equity. Perhaps surprisingly, then, a striking 31% of investing 
teams are also responsible for hedge fund investments. An even higher fraction of the teams (44%) 
are responsible for both real estate investments and private equity investments. 
The next variable measures the proportion of LPs that choose to delegate due diligence to 
specialized intermediaries. Half of the LPs say that they outsource part of their due diligence. 
Therefore, in all questions about due diligence we specify that we are asking for tasks that are carried 
over either in-house or outsourced.  
 The large majority of organizations have an investment committee (78%). Few committees 
vote with majority rule (24%); most require a consensus decision. Most committees are autonomous 
(75%), meaning that their decisions cannot be modified or vetoed by anyone external.  
 Our last set of survey questions looks at compensation policy. Well over one third of the 
organizations (38%) offer compensation pegged to financial performance; interestingly, this holds 
for both investment committee members and non-members. The variable part of the salary can be 
larger than the fixed part in 34% of the cases for investment committee members, and in 23% of the 
cases for other professionals. The use of performance-based compensation is often recent, as 29% 
of the respondents say that the compensation policy has changed over the past ten years and that 
bonuses were introduced.  
 Such reliance on performance-based compensation may be surprising because returns of 
private equity funds are notoriously difficult to measure, and they take a very long time to 
materialize. Interim Net Asset Values (NAV) reported by fund managers are likely to play a role in 
the bonus of the investing team. Given that the calculation of the NAV contains elements of 
subjectivity, this can lead to conflicting interests in that both the private equity investing team and 
the fund manager may accept inflated NAVs in some circumstances. 
                                                            
3 Since almost one fifth of the LPs do not have an investment committee, the number of observations is lower for the 
investment committee variable. 
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 Overall, Table 2 provides for the first time large-scale evidence on the internal organization 
and human resources of LPs, contributing to shed light on the ‘black box’ of LPs. Notably, it 
documents that internal organization significantly differs across LPs.  
3.2. LP size, team specialization and outsourcing 
We now study how LP characteristics are related to the specialization of the investment team. As in 
subsequent regressions, we employ a standard set of explanatory variables that include the four LP 
characteristics described in section 2.2: LP type, location, size, and experience, to which we add the 
experience of the LP’s parent. Following Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015) and Sensoy, Wang, and 
Weisbach (2014), we choose public pension funds as the omitted type category.  
 The first two specifications in Table 3 present results from Probit regressions that look at 
whether private equity teams also manage other investments. In the first specification, the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the team in charge of private equity 
investing is also in charge of hedge fund investing, and zero otherwise. In the second specification, 
the dependent variable is a dummy that identifies teams in charge of both private equity and real 
estate investments. In the third specification, which is estimated by Tobit, the dependent variable is 
the fraction of the private equity portfolio that is invested in fund-of-funds; this variable takes a value 
between 0% and 100%. In the last specification, which is estimated by Probit, the dependent variable 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the team declares that part of their due diligence 
activities are outsourced, and zero otherwise. 
< Table 3 > 
We find that larger LPs are more likely to have specialized investment teams. The last two 
rows of Table 3 report the mean values of the fraction of teams that also manage hedge funds or real 
estate funds for large and small LPs, defined as LPs in the top and bottom tercile of the size 
distribution, respectively. This effect is substantive: small LPs are more than twice as likely to 
manage also real estate assets, and more than three times as likely to manage also hedge funds. The 
other explanatory variables have little power; except for being an endowment, which decreases team 
specialization. In column (iii) we also find that larger LPs are less likely to invest in fund-of-funds. 
This effect is also sizeable. Small LPs invest in fund-of-funds three times as much as large LPs.  
Although they are less specialized, small LPs might outsource more due diligence activities. 
We look at this in column (iv). Type, location and experience affect the decision to outsource some 
due diligence activities, but investor size does not. Hence, those small LPs that manage private equity 
alongside hedge funds and real estate are not just outsourcing each type of due diligence more. This 
is a clear indication that smaller LPs do less due diligence when investing in private equity, even 
when we take outsourcing into account.  
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4. Investors’ Scope of Activities 
Our survey allows us to measure a variety of activities that span different dimensions of investing, 
which we aggregate into a summary measure of investor activity scope. We first look at descriptive 
statistics to open up the ‘black-box’ of private equity investing, and then study cross-sectional 
differences. 
4.1. Track record evaluation: Accounting and actuarial activities 
A key element that LPs consider when deciding to invest in a GP is past performance. An important 
challenge in the evaluation of GPs’ track record is the valuation of unrealized investments in 
portfolio companies, i.e. of Net Asset Values (NAVs). This means that past returns reported to LPs 
largely rely on subjective valuations of unrealized investments. Prospective investors may therefore 
want to re-evaluate NAVs using their own criteria. Item 1 in Table 4 shows that 24% of investors do 
so. 
In addition, performance figures provided by GPs are often aggregated. For example, a GP 
that raises a buyout fund may report performance measures that pool together previous investments 
in venture capital and buyouts. Likewise, a GP with high returns in its early funds, but not in its later 
funds, would pool all previous funds together and report only one aggregate performance number. 
For these reasons, an LP may want to compute its own measure of a GP’s past performance. Item 2 
in Table 4 shows that 52% of the LPs always do so (only 12% of the investors never do so; non-
tabulated). Finally, Item 3 shows that 77% of the investors always benchmark a GP’s track record. 
4.2. Contract evaluation: Legal activities 
The contractual rights of an investor in a private equity fund are governed by the Limited Partnership 
Agreement (LPA).4  The LPA details the fees to be paid by the LP to the GP and all legal covenants 
covering their relationship. Because the fees can have a large impact on performance and because 
the inclusion or exclusion of certain covenants can significantly affect potential conflicts of interest, 
comparing the LPAs of different funds is an important exercise. It is also a costly one, given that 
LPAs are technical and lengthy documents, typically over 100 pages. Item 4 of Table 4 shows that 
64% of investors benchmark the LPAs (sometimes or always; only a minority of LPs always do it).  
Since the late 1990s, some LPs have started obtaining special rights that are granted via 
separate ‘side letters’. Common reasons given for these are that an investor is considered a strategic 
or large client, or that the investor is subject to government regulation (e.g., ERISA, the Bank 
Holding Company Act, or public records laws). In addition, LPs may negotiate a ‘Most Favored 
Nation’ (MFN) provision that permits the election of certain benefits granted to other LPs via side 
                                                            
4 Gompers and Lerner (1996), Metrick and Yasuda (2010), and Litvak (2009) study contracts between GPs and LPs.  
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letters. In general, the MFN provision guarantees that the investor has the best terms granted to any 
other investor. It is unclear whether any of these side letters are favours granted to investors or 
whether certain investors need these to clear internal regulations (e.g. in terms of Corporate Social 
Responsibility). Either way, an investor asking for side letters engages in legal activities. 
 Items 5 and 6 in Table 4 show that 41% of the investors always obtain side letters and 36% 
of the investors always obtain the MFN clause. As these two proportions are quite similar, it is likely 
that there are only two LPAs: the default one and a special one, both of which are granted to a large 
group of investors.  
We also ask investors, more broadly, whether they negotiate contract terms (item 7 in Table 
4) and 59% report that they always do (only 15% report never doing so). This shows that LPAs are 
not a take-it-or leave-it proposition by the GP, but a document that investors tend to negotiate on  –
in contrast to common beliefs (Litvak (2009)). 
4.3. Direct investment activities: Co-investments and executive interviews  
Co-investing is a growing phenomenon in private equity (Phalippou (2009)): GPs invite LPs to co-
invest in a specific company, without charging additional fees. Engaging in co-investments is de 
facto a reduction in the overall fee bill for the investor that may improve net-of-fees returns. In 
addition, GPs may overweigh selected LPs in the best investments. At the same time, it is possible 
that LPs are invited to join less promising investments, larger investments, or have poor market 
timing abilities.   
LPs participating in co-investments engage in extra and costly due diligence to screen this 
type of opportunity. This is surprising at first sight because a co-investment is just an increase in an 
existing investment in a given company at no extra cost. However, co-investments increase career 
concerns. No investment manager would get fired from investing in funds managed by Blackstone 
or Bain Capital, but one could get fired for undertaking two co-investments offered by those GPs 
that performed poorly; hence the extra due diligence. 
We find that 75% of the investors in our sample have been invited at least once to co-invest. 
This is a remarkably high number given the diversity of our participants. However, we also find that 
the average invitee rejects on average a staggering 74% of the invitations. Overall, 52% of the 
respondents have made at least one co-investment (item 8 in Table 4). 
A related activity for investors is interviewing executives of portfolio companies in order to 
learn whether the GP adds value to the portfolio companies. As in co-investments, this requires LPs 
to know about company investment processes. In these interviews, LPs also assess whether the GP 
has a good reputation with entrepreneurs and executives, which is an important factor for assessing 
the quality of future deal flows. Item 9 in Table 4 shows that 37% of the investors ‘always’ interview 
portfolio company executives (50% do it sometimes, 13% never do it; non-tabulated). 
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4.4. Monitoring activities 
Unlike the monitoring of portfolio companies by the GP, the monitoring of the GP by the LP has not 
been covered in the literature. Because LPs cannot intervene in fund decisions, monitoring does not 
appear necessary at first sight. In fact, monitoring is useful in case the investor is considering selling 
its stake in a fund, or purchasing more, in the secondary market. But the most important reason to 
monitor is preparing due diligence for the reinvestment decision at a fund’s next fund-raising. LPs 
can monitor through a wide range of different actions, most of which are difficult to quantify. We 
ask three questions to assess monitoring activities. 
First, investors may monitor fund managers by sitting on fund advisory boards, provided they 
are invited to do so by the fund managers. Advisory boards are often designed to provide access to 
deals or technical expertise. Further, advisory boards have no legal obligations and are less formal 
than corporate boards of directors, while providing guidance and oversight for the operation of the 
fund, including portfolio company valuations. Half of the respondents have at least one board seat 
(item 10 in Table 4). 
Second, investors may monitor by keeping track of the composition of the fund’s underlying 
investments in terms of industry, deal size and country. This facilitates the next round of due 
diligence, and might trigger some intervention on the secondary market. Almost all the investors 
(82%) track the composition of their private equity portfolio (item 11 in Table 4). 
 Third, we use visits to portfolio companies held by the funds in which the LP is invested as 
another proxy for monitoring activities. Given that it is a time-consuming action that may require 
travelling and knowledge about which questions to ask, it is not a systematic practice. Relatively few 
LPs say they always do it (6%). A much larger share sometimes visits portfolio companies, but one 
third of the respondents (35%) never do so.  
< Table 4 > 
4.5 Determinants of investors’ scope of activities 
In column (i) of Table 4 we show the frequency of each of the twelve activities described in sub-
sections 4.1 to 4.4. We split this frequency by LP size: column (ii) for large investors (those in the 
top tercile of LP size), and column (iii) for small investors (those in the bottom tercile of LP size). 
Small investors are less likely than large investors to undertake ten out of twelve of the activities. 
Some particularly significant differences are found for legal activities (e.g. 17% of small investors 
always obtain side letters versus 63% of large investors) and for advisory board seats (26% of small 
investors have at least one board seat versus 67% of large investors). 
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 To capture investors’ scope of activities in a single variable, we take the fraction of activities 
pursued by each investor.5 Some pursue very few of the twelve activities and get a score of 0.1; some 
pursue them all and get a score of 100%. Figure 1 shows the histogram of investors’ scope of 
activities. There is a wide dispersion in scores across our respondents. 
Table 5 shows results from Tobit regression analysis in which investors’ activity scope 
measure is the dependent variable. Explanatory variables include the same set of variables as in 
Table 3: LP size, experience, type, location, and parent experience. We then add each of the investor 
characteristics listed in Table 2, one at a time. In the interest of space we show only those that are 
either statistically significant or of particular interest. Across all specifications, our results show LP 
size to be a highly significant determinant of LP activity scope. In column (i) we omit LP size to 
explore whether any LP types are strongly correlated with the scope of activities. We find that they 
are not.  
< Figure 1 > < Table 5 > 
Some of the additional explanatory variables from Table 2 also have a significant effect on 
the scope of due diligence. Organizations with larger amounts of capital under management (parent-
size) may have internal legal and accounting departments which could facilitate a broader scope of 
activities. Results in Table 5 – column (ii) show that this is not the case and that LP size is still the 
dominating explanatory variable for investors’ scope of activities. 
The next three specifications use different proxies for staffing as additional control variables 
(columns (iii), (iv), and (v)). We find that LPs with more private equity professionals have a wider 
scope of activities. In terms of workload, both the number of funds per investment professional and 
the amount of assets under management per investment professional are strongly, negatively related 
to the scope of activities. Accounting for staffing does not affect the statistical significance of LP 
size. 
In addition to these organizational characteristics, the allocation to private equity may also 
matter. Organizations with relatively little money in private equity may not find it worthwhile to 
undertake many different due diligence activities. Column (vi) of Table 5 shows that this is not the 
case, so that the relation to LP size is not driven by organizations exerting higher effort on a more 
important part of their portfolio. Finally, we look at the three variables that Lerner, Schoar, and 
Wongsunwai (2007) conjecture may lead to more sophisticated investment practices: performance-
based compensation, staff turnover, and the presence of conflicting objectives. Column (vii) of Table 
                                                            
5 We follow the spirit of the corporate governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). For investors who do 
not respond to all questions, we compute the fraction among the questions they answer. 
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5 shows that performance-based compensation is indeed correlated with the scope of investor 
activities, but it does not detract from the significance of LP size. Staff turnover is not significantly 
related to investor activities, and it does not affect the significance of LP size (unreported). We 
measure the presence of conflicting objectives for the LP by asking for the importance of creating 
business for the other divisions of the mother organization.  This variable also turns out not to be 
significant and not to affect the significance of LP size (unreported).   
While smaller LPs do not outsource due diligence more than larger LPs, they may effectively 
do so by investing in fund-of-funds. Funds-of-funds are likely to engage in extensive due diligence 
because this may be beneficial to returns and/or help market the quality of their services as 
intermediaries, therefore increasing the size of the funds they can raise and thus the fees they earn. 
To address this concern, we include in all regressions of Table 5 the percentage of fund-of-funds in 
the portfolio of an LP. Even so, LP size remains the main determinant of the scope of activities. 
In unreported results we verify that LP size is a significant determinant of each single 
component of the investors’ activity scope measure; in other words, the significance of LP size does 
not rely on aggregation.  
Table 6 reports results from some robustness tests. First, we exclude LPs that invest more in 
venture capital than in buyouts (column (i)), since the size of buyout funds is much larger, and the 
relationship between return and size is different from venture capital. We do not find any difference 
in results. Second, we address the concern that delegation of activities to fund-of-funds may drive 
our results by excluding all LPs who invest more than 10% in these (column (ii)). We find that the 
relation to LP size is unaffected. The two remaining specifications deal with endogeneity and are 
covered in the next section. 
4.6 Endogeneity 
LP size is to a certain extent endogenous and this affects the interpretation of our results. The most 
likely story is one of reverse causality: some investors start operating in a more thorough way than 
others, and are therefore more successful. Because they are more successful, they end up with more 
money to manage. Hence, it is wider scope of activities that implies larger-LP size and not vice versa. 
We offer three tests of this reverse causality hypothesis. First, we ask investors how much 
their allocation depends on their own past performance versus the overall industry performance, 
which is obviously exogenous to LP size. Investors, on average, indicate that industry performance 
accounts for about 50% in the determination of their private equity allocation decision, but this 
percentage varies widely. In column (iii) of Table 6 we report results from the baseline model of 
Table 5 where we exclude LPs  replying that more than half of their allocation decision is due to 
their own past performance. LP size remains statistically significant, contradicting the reverse 
causality hypothesis. 
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Second, we exclude LPs that have more than ten years of track record. Ten years being the 
usual duration of a private equity fund, these LPs are expected not to have any fully liquidated funds 
in their portfolio from which they can learn about their investing abilities. That is, they have little, if 
any, performance-related information upon which their size could depend. Results are shown in 
column (iv) of Table 6. Once again, LP size remains statistically significant. 
Third, in column (vi) of Table 5 we control for the parent organization’s allocation to private 
equity, which under the reverse causality hypothesis, should be the driving force; we still find that 
we do not observe any changes in the coefficient on LP size. 
Overall, these tests do not support a reverse causality story. However, we cannot rule out this 
hypothesis. 
< Table 6 > 
4.7 Time spent on due diligence 
We now consider investor activity from a different angle. Instead of looking at how many activities 
LPs carry out, we look at how much time LPs spend on due diligence activities. In the survey, we 
ask investors how many (full-time equivalent) days of work they typically put in to doing due 
diligence work for each of three types of funds: first-time funds, seasoned funds of GPs in which the 
investor has not already invested, and reinvestment decisions (‘re-ups’). The respective results from 
a regression analysis are shown in columns (i) to (iii) of Table 7. We find that LP size has a positive 
and significant relation with the dependent variables throughout all specifications. The last two rows 
of Table 7 show that the amount of time spent on due diligence is more than twice as large for large 
LPs than for small LPs: a very large effect indeed. Interestingly, the effect is largest in the case of 
first-time funds, where uncertainty is highest. Other LP characteristics play a role only in the case of 
first time funds: North American LPs spend more time on them, while more experienced LPs spend 
less time - possibly a sign that they are more productive.  
< Table 7 > < Table 8 > < Table 9 > 
 
5. Team size 
We now move to analyse the relation between LP size and the size of the private equity team. Our 
goal is to understand how LPs of different size distribute workloads across their employees, given 
the large variation in staffing reported in Table 2. We first run regressions with the number of private 
equity professionals (team size) as the dependent variable. Results in columns (i) and (ii) in Table 8 
show that the relationship between team size and LP size is statistically significant, positive, and 
linear. Team size, however, is not related to the number of funds in the portfolio, as shown in 
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columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 8. This is surprising, because the workload is more likely to be 
proportional to the number of funds rather than to the amount under management. Investing $100 
million in one fund should require fewer professionals than investing $5 million in twenty funds. 
Our results in Table 8 show instead that as LP size increases, the workload does not increase as fast, 
all else equal, and the slack is probably absorbed by the LP taking on more activities. This is 
consistent with our previous results and corroborates the evidence that larger LPs spend more 
resources on due diligence activities.  
Table 9 further documents these relationships using descriptive statistics broken down by LP 
size quintiles. The smallest LP quintile contains LPs with less than $75 million under management 
in private equity. The largest LP quintile contains LPs with over $1 billion under management in 
private equity. Consistent with our previous findings, we note that the scope of activities increases 
monotonically across LP size quintiles. The number of private equity funds also goes up with LP 
size in a linear fashion, but when we look at the number of private equity professionals per fund, it 
tends to remain constant.  
This last result provides an interesting comparison with the predictions of Stein (2002), who 
argues that larger organizations are more hierarchical and therefore tend to rely more on hard 
information than smaller ones, because of incentives and communication problems. Berger et al. 
(2005) confirm these predictions for banks. We show that this may not hold for other financial 
intermediaries. Larger LPs do not become more hierarchical organizations. Their flat structure and 
small number of professionals allow the collection, processing, and communication of soft 
information through due diligence. 
 
6. Fund selection criteria 
Finally, we ask investors to rank a large set of investing criteria that they use to select funds in order 
to analyse the relationship between LP size and the criteria LP use to select GPs. This question is 
asked separately for three types of funds: first-time funds, seasoned funds of firms in which the 
investor is not already invested, and reinvestment decisions (‘re-ups’). We consolidate their answers 
across all three sets of questions and standardize them so they are comparable across investors.6  
Table 10 shows the results from regression analyses. The five retained specifications 
correspond to the questions whose score was most significantly related to LP size. First, smaller LPs 
give a significantly higher score to the importance of ‘commitments by other LPs’ as an investment 
criterion (Table 10, column (i)).  
                                                            
6 We subtract from each score the average investor score to that question and divide by its standard deviation. 
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Second, smaller LPs also give more importance to ‘advisor and gatekeeper opinion’ (Table 
10, column (ii)). This is consistent with smaller LPs believing that their due diligence is limited. 
These two results are in line with our findings above that larger LPs conduct more thorough due 
diligence, and therefore pay little attention to both external advice and what others do.  
Third, the fund selection criterion receiving the largest score is past performance, measured 
as either IRR or Multiple (i.e. total amount distributed divided by total amount invested). This result 
is consistent with empirical studies showing that fundraising in private equity is related to past 
returns in the asset class (Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), Gompers and Lerner (1998)). However,  the 
importance of past performance is unclear. Phalippou (2010) and more recently, Brown, Gredil, and 
Kaplan (2015) show that past performance, if computed at the time of fund-raising, does not predict 
future performance. The literature has also pointed out that performance measures such as the IRR 
are often misleading in a private equity context, while Multiple is a more robust measure of 
performance (Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014), Phalippou (2008)). We find that 18% of the 
respondents select past IRR as the most important criteria, while only 13% of the respondents select 
Multiple as the most important. Moreover, Table 10 column (iii) shows that larger LPs give a 
significantly higher score to past Multiple than do smaller LPs. For IRR, smaller LPs tend to give a 
higher score, but this effect is not statistically significant. 
Fourth, larger LPs give a significantly higher score to the importance of both ‘fund-size’ and 
‘valuation of unrealized investments’ To assess whether either the fund-size or the valuation of 
unrealized investments is appropriate, it is necessary to have conducted thorough due diligence. One 
interpretation is that smaller LPs are not in a position to judge the appropriateness of these two 
important investment criteria, consistent with our findings on investors’ scope.  
As the last two rows of Table 10 show, the difference between large and small LPs is 
consistent across investment criteria. These results are also consistent with investors believing that 
there are increasing returns to scale for due diligence in an asset such as private equity funds. 
< Table 10 > 
 
7. Conclusion 
Industry observers (e.g., Swensen (2000)) have argued that endowments are better equipped to assess 
and evaluate emerging alternative investments, such as private equity, in which asymmetric 
information problems are especially severe. Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) document that 
improved access, as well as experience of investing in the private equity sector, led endowments to 
outperform other institutional investors substantially during the 1990s.  
Private equity, however, is no longer an emerging and unfamiliar asset class. Investors such 
as the Canadian CPPIB and the Dutch AlpInvest have built private equity portfolios worth over $50 
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billion each in just over a decade. In contrast, both the Yale and Harvard endowments, pioneer 
investors in that asset class, have private equity portfolios worth around $5 billion. The emergence 
of very large investors goes hand in hand with the disintermediation of private equity. Large 
investors either co-invest alongside funds or even bypass funds altogether (Fang, Ivashina, and 
Lerner (2015)). Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach (2014) have documented that the outperformance of 
endowments no longer holds in more recent years.  
Using a large-scale survey, we document for the first time how private equity investors 
approach their investment decisions. We show that institutional investors exhibit considerable 
heterogeneity in their structure, behaviour, and investment criteria. LP size is the only variable that 
consistently captures this variation. The rapid concentration in the asset management industry should 
therefore significantly change the characteristics and behaviour of the average investor.  
We lack a truly exogenous source of LP size variation that would allow us to make a clear 
causal interpretation of our results. As we discuss in section 4.6, a reverse causality interpretation is 
equally likely, though we provide tests that are at odds with this view. In either case, there is no 
implication that larger LP size should bring higher returns, given decreasing returns to scale in 
deploying capital.  
An interpretation in which the rise of larger asset managers leads to an increase in screening 
and monitoring activities is also consistent with the balance of power tilting towards investors and 
away from fund managers, as documented by recent studies for several dimensions. First: decreased 
accounting manipulation by private equity partnerships at the time of fund-raising, which is largely 
limited to small funds backed by small investors (see Brown, Gredil, and Kaplan (2015) and Barber 
and Yasuda (2013)). Second: increased disintermediation in private equity, especially by the largest 
investors (see Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015)). Third: increased access to the best-performing 
private equity funds, except for small and specialized venture capital funds (see Sensoy, Wang, and 
Weisbach (2014)). 
Such interpretation also has implications for the organizational design of institutional 
investors. For example, consider the decision to invest in private equity for a Norwegian or Chinese 
Sovereign Wealth fund — among the largest asset owners in the world, yet private equity novices. 
On the one hand, it might be difficult for these investors to enter private equity because they have 
little experience and lack relationships with funds. On the other hand, perhaps all you need is cash. 
Our results suggest that if the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund invested 1% of its $7.5 billion capital 
in private equity we would expect the same type of due diligence, fund terms and conditions, GP 
monitoring, and investment criteria as for Yale’s endowment, with 30% of its $20 billion fund 
allocated to private equity. Whether this should lead to higher returns, however, is not clear and is a 
promising avenue for future research. 
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In addition to opening the black box of investors’ organizational and decision-making 
processes in a major asset class, this paper shows that investor size is an important statistic to capture 
investor heterogeneity. The literature studying issues related to investor size focuses mainly on the 
returns of financial intermediaries. Our study, in contrast, focuses on the interaction between 
organizational structure and actions in what is arguably the most complex and specialized type of 
assets to which investors allocate capital: private equity. We therefore contribute to the literature 
debating which investor characteristics matter in complex and specialized asset classes. 
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Table 1 – Main investor characteristics and sample representativeness 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables defined in section 2.2. PEI Universe is the 
list of investors contained in the 2008 Private Equity International (PEI) Directory. Our sample 
includes only respondents providing their type (Panel A), location (Panel B), amount of private 
equity  capital under management (Panel C) and year of first investment in private equity  (Panel D).   
 
Panel A: LP type (investor category) 
LP type Obs. Fraction in 
our sample 
Fraction in 
PEI Universe 
Public pension funds 76 31% 21% 
Corporate pension funds 20 8% 21% 
Endowments 43 17% 21% 
Insurance companies 24 10% 8% 
Banks/Finance companies 46 18% 23% 
Others 40 16% 6% 
 
Panel B: Region of LP location 
LP Region Obs. Fraction in 
our sample 
Fraction in 
PEI Universe 
North America 81 33% 56% 
Continental Europe 56 22% 16% 
Scandinavia 35 14% 5% 
United Kingdom 30 12% 8% 
Australia 15 6% 4% 
Japan  12 5% 5% 
Rest of the World 20 8% 4% 
 
Panel C: LP size (Amount of private equity capital under management, 2008; $ million) 
LP size Obs. Fraction in 
our sample 
Fraction in 
PEI Universe 
0 ≤ . < 100  72 29% 36% 
100 ≤ . < 250 36 14% 17% 
250 ≤ . < 600 55 22% 17% 
600 ≤ . < 2000 50 20% 15% 
. ≥ 2000 36 14% 15% 
 
Panel D: LP experience (2008 minus the year firm started to invest in private equity) 
LP experience 
 
Obs. Fraction in 
our sample 
Fraction in 
PEI Universe 
0  ≤ . < 4 years  48 19% 11% 
4 ≤ . < 7 years 34 14% 12% 
7 ≤ . < 10 years 55 22% 19% 
10 ≤ . < 15 years 57 23% 22% 
. ≥ 15 years 55 22% 36% 
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Table 2: Organizational Structure and Human Resources 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables measuring LP organizational structure and 
human resources management. Variables are defined in section 3.1. Panel A reports statistics for 
continuous variables and Panel B for binary variables. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics: continuous variables 
 Mean St. Dev. Percentile  
  25th  75th Obs. 
LP size ($ million) 1,291 3,550 75.71 943.8 242 
Parent experience (years) 43.77 51.51 10.00 57.00 242 
Parent size ($ billion) 32.33 108.01 0.70 14.91 219 
Number of PE professionals 6.42 12.08 1.00 5.00 172 
Number of Investment committee (IC)  members 7.10 6.76 4.00 8.00 163 
Private equity allocation (%) 0.25 0.34 0.03 0.26 219 
Number of funds held 37.62 43.16 9.00 56.00 167 
Funds per PE professional 17.88 21.45 4.27 23.12 144 
Dollars per PE professional ($ million) 205.91 217.64 39.50 288.90 172 
Average IC members experience (years) 10.02 5.38 6.00 13.08 129 
Investment Committee turnover 0.27 0.37 0.00 0.40 99 
Fund-of-funds in portfolio (%) 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.33 155 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics: binary variables 
Answers: yes (=1), no (=0) Frequency Obs. 
PE team also manages hedge funds 0.31 239 
PE team also manages real estate 0.44 239 
 Outsource some due diligence or monitoring activities 0.50 175 
Do you have an Investment Committee (IC)? 0.78 216 
Are IC decisions taken by majority voting? 0.24 207 
Are the IC decisions completely autonomous? 0.75 121 
Is part of the IC compensation related to financial performance? 0.38 180 
     . If yes, Is the bonus larger than the fixed salary? 0.34 64 
Do other investment professionals receive a bonus? 0.42 179 
     . If yes, Is the bonus larger than the fixed salary? 0.23 66 
Has the compensation policy changed over the past 10 years? 0.29 179 
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Table 3: LP size and team specialization 
This table reports results from Probit and Tobit regressions. The dependent variable differs in each 
specification. In column (i) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if 
the team in charge of private equity is also in charge of hedge fund investing, and zero otherwise. In 
column  (ii) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the team in 
charge of private equity is also in charge of real estate investing, and is zero otherwise. In column 
(iii) the dependent variable is the percentage of the PE portfolio that is invested in fund-of-funds. In 
column (iv) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if part of the due 
diligence activities are outsourced (and zero otherwise). The explanatory variables are defined in 
sections 2.2 and 3.1. Specifications (i), (ii), and (iv) are estimated by Probit, and specification (iii) 
by Tobit. A constant is included but not shown. t-statistics are reported in italics between 
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). 
 
 
 
(i) 
Team also manages
Hedge Funds 
(ii)  
Team also manages
Real Estate 
(iii) 
% fund-of-funds 
in PE portfolio 
(iv) 
Outsource some
due diligence 
LP size (log) -0.18a -0.16a -0.06a -0.08 
 (-3.22) (-2.88) (-4.04) (-1.18) 
Corporate pension funds 0.39 0.68c -0.02 0.27 
 (1.13) (1.95) (-0.18) (0.62) 
Endowments 0.78a 0.98a -0.04 0.06 
 (2.63) (3.17) (-0.50) (0.17) 
Insurance companies 0.06 -0.07 0.01 -0.31 
 (0.16) (-0.22) (0.13) (-0.89) 
Banks/Finance companies 0.08 -0.69b -0.11 -1.28a 
 (0.26) (-2.40) (-1.55) (-3.56) 
Other LP types 0.04 -0.42 -0.18a -0.62b 
 (0.14) (-1.54) (-2.62) (-2.07) 
North America -0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.48c 
 (-0.41) (0.32) (-0.07) (-1.89) 
Continental Europe -0.30 0.13 0.09 -0.61b 
 (-1.17) (0.51) (1.43) (-2.16) 
LP experience (log) -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.33c 
 (-0.23) (-0.50) (0.37) (-1.91) 
Parent experience (log) 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.13 
 (0.78) (0.05) (0.09) (1.26) 
(OLS) R-square 15.0 22.5 17.4 21.1 
Number of observations 239 239 155 175 
Mean value of the dependent variable for:    
Small LPs 0.52 0.61 0.25 0.56 
Large LPs 0.15 0.26 0.08 0.43 
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Table 4: Measuring the scope of investor activities 
This table reports the frequency at which investor activities are undertaken. Each investor activity is 
defined in section 4. Frequency is reported for the whole sample, for the sub-samples of large 
investors (top LP size tercile), and small investors (bottom LP size tercile). The bottom row reports 
the scaled investor activity scope measure, defined in section 4.5, averaged across investors. We 
require a minimum of three entries to compute an LP’s scaled investor activity scope measure of 
scope. In the last column the superscripts a, b and c indicate whether the frequencies for the sub-
sample of large investors are statistically different from these for the sub-sample of small investors 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
   Fraction of investors 
undertaking the activity 
among:  
   
Obs. 
(i) 
All 
LPs 
(ii) 
Large 
LPs 
(iii) 
Small 
LPs 
 Accounting activities     
1 Use own fair value of unrealized investments 143 0.24 0.37 0.21 b
 Actuarial activities    
2 Always calculate own GP past performance measure 184 0.52 0.60 0.47 c
3 Always benchmark GP track record 179 0.77 0.84 0.65 a
 Legal activities    
4 Benchmark contracts (LPAs) 185 0.64 0.66 0.56 
5 Always obtain side letters 174 0.41 0.63 0.17 a
6 Always obtain ‘Most Favored Nation’ clause 171 0.36 0.55 0.13 a
7 Always negotiate contract terms 172 0.59 0.74 0.36 a
 Investment activities    
8 Has co-invested alongside a PE fund 189 0.52 0.70 0.33 a
9 Always interview portfolio company executives 189 0.37 0.41 0.32 
 Monitoring activities    
10 Has advisory board seats on some PE funds 185 0.49 0.67 0.26 a
11 Track PE portfolio mix (industry/size/country) 177 0.82 0.88 0.72 a
12 Has visited portfolio companies 165 0.65 0.70 0.47 a
 Scaled investor activity scope measure: 242 0.46 0.59 0.34 a
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Table 5: Determinants of the scope of investor activities 
This table reports results from seven Tobit regression models where the dependent variable is the 
scaled investor activity scope measure defined in section 4.5; this variable takes values between 
zero and one. The explanatory variables common to all specifications are defined in section 2.2; the 
other explanatory variables are defined in section 3.1. A constant is included but not shown. t-
statistics are reported in italics between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions are indicated 
by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
LP size (log)  0.07a 0.05a 0.07a 0.07a 0.06a 0.06a 
  (5.43) (4.06) (5.83) (6.63) (6.47) (5.68) 
Corporate pension funds -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 
 (-1.12) (-0.62) (-0.76) (-0.59) (-0.21) (-0.61) (-0.91)
Endowments -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 
 (-1.63) (-1.49) (-0.42) (-0.34) (-0.46) (-1.52) (-1.35)
Insurance companies -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09c -0.03 -0.05 
 (-0.81) (-0.35) (-1.36) (-0.43) (-1.74) (-0.50) (-0.90)
Banks/Finance companies -0.07 -0.08c -0.13a -0.11b -0.13a -0.08c -0.11b 
 (-1.51) (-1.81) (-2.87) (-2.24) (-2.94) (-1.80) (-2.36)
Other LP types -0.07 -0.08c -0.10b -0.06 -0.10b -0.09b -0.11b 
 (-1.31) (-1.79) (-2.32) (-1.28) (-2.34) (-2.00) (-2.35)
North America  0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
  (0.18) (0.85) (0.81) (0.96) (0.20) (0.33) 
Continental Europe  -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
  (-0.59) (-0.24) (-1.52) (-0.28) (-0.72) (-0.26)
LP experience (log)  -0.04c -0.05b -0.05b -0.06b -0.04 -0.05c 
  (-1.65) (-2.08) (-2.02) (-2.29) (-1.58) (-1.88)
Parent experience (log)  -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
  (-1.31) (-0.95) (-0.03) (-0.39) (-1.26) (-0.81)
Fund-of-funds in portfolio (%)  -0.12c -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12c -0.12c 
  (-1.71) (-0.76) (-0.15) (-0.31) (-1.73) (-1.65)
Parent size (log)  0.00      
  (-0.46)      
Number of PE professionals   0.04c     
   (1.88)     
Funds per PE professional    -0.02a    
    (-2.58)    
Dollars per PE professional     -0.01a   
     (-2.60)   
PE allocation (%)      0.02  
      (0.53)  
Performance-based compensation       0.07c 
       (1.95) 
(OLS) R-square 5.1 33.4 35.5 38.1 36.7 33.0 32.7 
Number of observations 180 180 155 127 155 181 178 
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Table 6: Robustness tests 
This table reports results from Tobit regression models where the dependent variable is the scaled 
investor activity scope measure defined in section 4.5; this variable takes values between zero and 
one. The explanatory variables are defined in sections 2.2 and 3.1. In each column some LPs are 
excluded from the sample: in column (i) LPs that invest more of their PE portfolio in venture capital 
than in buyouts, in column (ii) LPs that invest more than 10% of their PE portfolio in fund-of-funds, 
in column (iii) LPs that base their allocation to private equity mostly on their own past performance, 
in column (iv) LPs that have been active in private equity since before 1998. A constant is included 
but not shown.  t-statistics are reported in italics between parentheses. Significance levels in 
regressions are indicated by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%).  
 
Exclude from the  
sample LPs investing: 
(i) 
more in VC
than in BO 
(ii) 
more than 10% 
in fund-of-funds
(iii) 
most as a 
function of their 
past performance 
(iv) 
since 
before 1998
LP size (log) 0.07a 0.07a 0.07a 0.07a 
 (4.54) (6.94) (6.85) (5.53) 
Corporate pension funds -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 
 (-0.37) (-0.55) (-0.73) (-0.82) 
Endowments 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.45) (-1.57) (-0.71) (-0.42) 
Insurance companies 0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.42) (-1.30) (-0.67) (-0.30) 
Banks/Finance companies -0.04 -0.09b -0.12b -0.05 
 (-0.51) (-2.01) (-2.15) (-0.88) 
Other LP types 0.01 -0.10b -0.06 -0.01 
 (0.18) (-2.24) (-1.15) (-0.19) 
North America 0.11c 0.04 0.04 0.03 
 (1.81) (0.98) (0.91) (0.60) 
Continental Europe -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 
 (-1.47) (-0.33) (-0.37) (-1.37) 
LP experience (log) -0.02 -0.04c 0.01 -0.03 
 (-0.48) (-1.75) (0.32) (-0.89) 
Parent experience (log) -0.05b -0.02 -0.02 -0.04b 
 (-2.03) (-1.44) (-1.08) (-2.05) 
(OLS) R-square 39.5 32.1 40.6 36.7 
Number of  observations 72 166 123 85 
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Table 7: LP size and time spent on due diligence 
This table reports results from OLS regressions. In the first three columns the dependent variable 
is a the number of (full-time-equivalent) days spent on due diligence (in-house and outsourced) for 
different types of private equity funds. In column (i) the due diligence is for first time funds, in 
column (ii) for first investments in a fund operated by an already active (‘seasoned’) GP, and in 
column (iii) for re-investments in funds operated by GPs into which the LP has already invested 
(‘re-up’). The explanatory variables are defined in section 2.2. A constant is included but not 
shown.  t-statistics are reported in italics between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions 
are indicated by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%).  
 
 Time spent on due diligence for:  
 
 
(i) 
investing in a  
first-time fund  
(ii) 
first investment in  
a seasoned fund 
(iii) 
a re-up 
 
LP size (log) 6.41a 3.16b 3.55a  
 (3.68) (2.49) (2.97)  
Corporate pension funds -14.9c -6.70 -4.05  
 (-1.72) (-0.89) (-0.58)  
Endowments -11.17 -1.50 -1.86  
 (-1.23) (-0.21) (-0.28)  
Insurance companies -11.13 8.38 3.94  
 (-1.35) (1.45) (0.74)  
Banks/Finance companies -0.53 6.37 4.77  
 (-0.08) (1.11) (0.90)  
Other LP types -0.46 1.43 3.22  
 (-0.07) (0.27) (0.66)  
North America 15.88a -0.30 3.86  
 (2.69) (-0.07) (0.92)  
Continental Europe 1.82 -5.24 -3.11  
 (0.31) (-1.14) (-0.73)  
LP experience (log) -8.09c 0.75 0.23  
 (-1.88) (0.22) (0.07)  
Parent experience (log) 1.88 0.24 0.45  
 (0.80) (0.13) (0.25)  
(OLS) R-square 38.8 17.3 16.4  
Number of observations 50 82 82  
Mean value of the dependent variable for:   
Small LPs 14.3 11.1 7.3  
Large LPs 31.1 23.2 19.2  
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Table 8: Number of employees and LP size – Regression analysis 
This table reports results from OLS regressions whose dependent variable is the number of PE 
professionals employed by LPs. The explanatory variables are defined in section 2.2; LP size is 
measured in US dollars billion. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in italics 
between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions are indicated by a (1%), b (5%), and c 
(10%).  
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Constant 3.17a 2.79a 2.18a 2.12b 
 (5.68) (5.04) (3.63) (2.29) 
LP size 2.48a 3.02a 3.41b 3.40b 
 (13.15) (4.40) (2.54) (2.46) 
LP size squared  -0.02 -0.11 -0.10 
  (-0.90) (-0.65) (-0.65) 
Number of PE funds   0.01 0.01 
   (0.34) (0.23) 
Number of PE funds squared    0.00 
    (-0.08) 
R-square 59.4 59.8 28.8 28.8 
Number of observations 172 172 133 133 
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Table 9: LP size, number of employees and scope of activities – Quintile analysis 
This table shows statistics on the number of employee and scope of activities based on LP size quintiles. Variables are defined in section 2.2; LP size is 
measured in in US dollars million. ‘Scope of activities’ is the scaled investor activity score measure defined in section 4.5. 
 
 LP size   
Number of LPs 
in the quintile 
  Mean    
Minimum  
(excluded) 
Maximum 
(included) 
Mean 
  Number of 
PE professionals 
Number of  
PE funds 
Scope of  
activities 
 PE professionals 
per PE fund 
0.0 74.8 35.0  25  1.22 11.88 0.39  0.11 
74.8 227.1 146.5  26  2.76 20.42 0.46  0.15 
227.1 459.0 347.6  25  3.54 24.28 0.57  0.13 
459.0 1020.0 704.6  26  8.53 52.23 0.57  0.07 
1020.0 11087.9 3354.1  25  13.50 90.24 0.75  0.12 
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Table 10: Fund selection criteria 
This table reports results from Tobit regressions. Dependent variables are standardized score of investor selection criteria; scores range on a Likert scale 
from zero (the criterion is irrelevant) to five (the criterion is crucial). The standardization consists in subtracting the average answer of an investor across 
all of the questions and dividing by the standard deviation (i.e. building a z-score for each question and each investor). The explanatory variables are 
defined in sections 2.2 and 3.1. A constant is included but not shown. t-statistics are shown in italics between parenthesis. Significance levels in 
regressions are indicated by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%). 
 
(i) 
Commitments 
of other LPs 
(ii) 
Advisor or gatekeeper  
opinion 
(iii) 
Multiple  
previous funds 
(iv) 
Fund size 
(v) 
Valuation  
unrealized investments 
LP size (log) -0.16a -0.10a 0.16a 0.15a 0.08b 
 (-2.95) (-2.61) (4.76) (3.51) (2.42) 
Corporate pension funds -0.23 0.00 0.07 0.29 -0.02 
 (-0.81) (-0.00) (0.28) (0.85) (-0.11) 
Endowments -0.22 -0.14 0.40b 0.40c -0.23 
 (-0.80) (-0.70) (1.96) (1.78) (-1.37) 
Insurance companies -0.35 0.18 0.26 0.39 0.22 
 (-1.28) (0.85) (1.33) (1.60) (1.40) 
Banks/Finance companies -0.41b 0.08 0.10 0.32 -0.02 
 (-2.02) (0.39) (0.61) (1.44) (-0.15) 
Other LP types -0.05 -0.04 0.35b 0.27 -0.13 
 (-0.22) (-0.23) (2.20) (1.27) (-0.77) 
North America 0.31 -0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.01 
 (1.44) (-0.48) (0.12) (0.40) (-0.06) 
Continental Europe -0.08 0.27 -0.19 -0.41b 0.16 
 (-0.53) (1.55) (-1.44) (-2.23) (1.12) 
LP experience (log) -0.08 0.08 -0.19a 0.04 -0.02 
 (-0.57) (0.80) (-2.60) (0.36) (-0.28) 
Parent experience (log) 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10b 
 (0.88) (0.40) (-0.51) (-0.22) (-2.03) 
(OLS) R-square 14.95 8.31 15.00 13.60 14.95 
Number of observations 153.0 153.0 153.0 137.0 137.0 
Mean value of the dependent variable for:     
Small LPs -0.41 -0.29 -0.37 -0.39 -0.22 
Large LPs -1.08 -0.65 0.11 0.18 0.21 
 32 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram of the investor scope of activities 
The figure reports the histogram for the scaled investor scope of activity score variable defined in 
section 4.5. 
 
 
